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Many important decisions are taken according to weighted majority rule. Power
indices predict that enlargement of the voting body may affect the balance of power
between the original members even if their number of votes and the decision rule
remain constant. Some of the existing voters may actually gain, a phenomenon known
as the paradox of new members. We test for this effect using laboratory experiments.
Participants propose and vote on how to divide a budget according to weighted
majority voting rules, and we measure the voting power of a player by his average
payoff in the experiment. By comparing voting power across voting bodies of varying
size, we find empirical support for the paradox of new members. Our results also
allow an assessment of the predictive performance of standard power indices.
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INTRODUCTION
Many important collective bodies make decisions by weighted majority voting:
different members control different numbers of votes. Examples are the Electoral
College in the United States, the International Monetary Fund, and the Council of
Ministers in the European Union.
Different voting weights typically reflect differences in sizes of populations or
resources of the states. However, it is well known that the voting power of a state may
be very imperfectly correlated with its voting weight (see e.g. Banzhaf, 1965). For
example, a state controlling 51% of the votes has all the power under simple majority
voting. The imperfect correlation between weights and power makes institutional
design more complex. In order to analyze voting power a number of power indices
have been proposed, the most important of which are the Shapley (1953) value or
Shapley-Shubik (1964) index, and the Banzhaf (1965) index. These indices often
predict unintended consequences of institutional change. For example, in the context
of changes in the IMF voting rules, Dreyer and Schotter (1980) claim that there is “a
noticeable discrepancy between what one would think the consequences of the voting
changes would be and what they actually are”.
A particular instance of counterintuitive effects of institutional change is the
paradox of new members (Brams and Affuso, 1976). Brams and Affuso show that
when a new member is added to a voting body the power indices of some original
members may increase, even if the original members’ weights and the decision rule
remain unchanged. The reason is that the addition of the new member may present
some of the existing members but not others with greater opportunities to form
winning coalitions.
Brams and Affuso’s examples are not merely theoretical curiosities. For EU
enlargements it has been viewed as desirable that “the existing balance of power
between the Member States … be broadly preserved” (Enlargement of the
Community: Transitional Period and Institutional implications, 1978; cited in Brams
and Affuso, 1985); between 1973 and 1986 the voting weights of existing members
and the percentage of votes needed for a majority have been kept constant in
enlargements of the EU Council of Ministers (see e.g. Felsenthal and Machover,
2001, table I). However, formal power analysis suggests the existing balance of power2
was not preserved in any enlargement: every enlargement increased either the Shapley
value or Banzhaf index for some existing member state (Brams and Affuso, 1985).
2
Of course, whether the enlargements have actually increased an original
member state’s voting power is more difficult to ascertain. A natural empirical
measure of voting power is the proportion of the benefits from legislation that accrue
to a voter, but in order to use this one would need information on the material
consequences of enlargement of the voting body. Two difficulties immediately
present themselves. First, changes in the membership of the voting body are usually
accompanied by other changes in the legislative process, so that it may be difficult to
disentangle the effect of enlargement from changes in these other factors. Second, the
material consequences of membership may be difficult to measure, and also be
influenced by numerous other factors. For example, even for the case of the EU,
where weights and decision rules have remained stable across enlargements, it is
difficult to measure the benefits of membership for a particular member, let alone how
these benefits have changed due, ceteris paribus, to enlargement.
3
These difficulties with uncovering empirical relationships between voting
structure and voting power have led to a heavy reliance on assumptions about the
relevant power index for formal analysis. The objective of our paper is to use
laboratory experiments to empirically examine the relation between the distribution of
voting weights and voting power. In our experiment participants propose and vote on
how to distribute a fixed budget among themselves.
4  This approach allows us to use a
natural empirical measure of voting power -- the average share of the budget realized
by a voter -- and relate it to voting weight, decision rule, and the composition of the
voting body. In particular we study three treatments, corresponding to the examples in
Brams and Affuso (1976), and examine how the balance of power between the
original parties is affected by the addition of a new member. We find significant
discrepancies between empirical measures of voting power and standard power
indices. However, in a comparative static sense the theoretical predictions of Brams
and Affuso are borne out. In particular, the empirical voting power of an existing
                                                
2 The paradox has also theoretically occurred in the US Electoral College (see Brams and Affuso,
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Deemen and Rusinowska, 2003).
3 There have been attempts to correlate voting weights and net financial transfers in the EU, but these
are qualified by the substantial difficulties with obtaining accurate net transfer data: see Baldwin
(1994).
4 Thus we focus on purely distributive policies.3
member increases with the addition of a new member, thus the paradox of new
members is observed.
THREE VOTING GAMES
Our three treatments correspond to the examples used in Brams and Affuso (1976). In
all treatments there is a ‘strong’ player with three votes and two ‘weak’ players with
two votes each. In our first treatment these three players comprise the voting body,
and five votes are needed to pass a proposal. Here, the strong player has veto power,
since no proposal can be passed without her votes, and so we refer to this as our
VETO treatment. Our second treatment is identical except that only four votes are
needed to pass a proposal. As a consequence, no player has a strategic advantage over
the others, since any two members have enough votes to pass a proposal. This is
reflected by all sophisticated measures of voting power, which assign equal power to
each player, and thus we refer to this as our SYMMETRIC treatment. In our third
treatment five votes are needed to pass a proposal, and there is an additional member
with a single vote: we refer to this as our ENLARGED treatment.
In all treatments proposals specify how to divide a budget of 120 points. Table
1 contains predicted voting powers for each treatment. The predicted voting power of
a player is the number of points they can expect to gain; the predictions are based on
the core (which, when empty, is replaced by Schmeidler’s (1969) extension, the
Nucleolus), the two best-known power indices (Shapley and Banzhaf) and a naïve
power index that assigns payoffs proportionally to the voting weights.
5
                                                
5 Conceptually the Shapley value seems the most appropriate power index for distributive decisions
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the Banzhaf index (see Felsenthal and Machover, 1998, p.174 for a discussion), and the Nucleolus (see
Montero, 2005).4






Player 1 3 120 80 72 51
Player 2 2 0 20 24 34
Player 3 2 0 20 24 34
* 5 votes required to pass a proposal
SYMMETRIC Treatment
Voting Power
Votes* Nucleolus Shapley Banzhaf Proportional
Player 1 3 40 40 40 51
Player 2 2 40 40 40 34
Player 3 2 40 40 40 34
* 4 votes required to pass a proposal
ENLARGED Treatment
Voting Power
Votes* Nucleolus Shapley Banzhaf Proportional
Player 1 3 40 50 50 45
Player 2 2 40 30 30 30
Player 3 2 40 30 30 30
Player 4 1 0 10 10 15
* 5 votes required to pass a proposal
Relative to VETO, ENLARGED allows us to test whether the paradox of new
members occurs when the total number of votes required to pass a proposal is held
constant. As with any enlargement, the naïve, proportional, power index predicts all
the original members lose voting power and so the paradox will not occur. However,
the other measures predict that the weak players’ voting power will increase. This is
because the addition of the new member eliminates the strong player’s veto power,
and so the other original members no longer depend on the strong player.
6
                                                
6 For this type of enlargement, where a player loses veto power, it is intuitive that other original
members will be empowered. However, this is not a general result. Suppose four voters have 4, 2, 1,
and 1 votes respectively, and 7 votes are required to pass a proposal (so that the two larger players have
veto power). If a fifth voter with 4 votes is added the large players lose veto power, but the other
original members are worse-off according to the Shapley and Banzhaf measures and unaffected
according to the Nucleolus.5
Relative to SYMMETRIC, ENLARGED allows us to test the paradox of new
members when a simple majority of votes is required to pass a proposal. Here, the
effect on the original members is less intuitive. Intuitively, the weak original members
are worse-off after enlargement: they no longer have enough votes to enforce a
proposal on their own, and now need the cooperation of the new member. The large
player becomes the most powerful in relative terms, but it is not clear whether his
power should increase in absolute terms; this is indeed the case according to the
Banzhaf and Shapley measures. The Nucleolus makes the extreme prediction that the
existing members are unaffected.
THE EXPERIMENT
Design and Procedures
The experiment comprised twelve sessions conducted at the University of Nottingham
using subjects recruited by e-mail from a university-wide pool of undergraduate
students. Four sessions were conducted with each treatment, and involved either 12
subjects (VETO and SYMMETRIC treatments) or 16 subjects (ENLARGED
treatment) per session. Thus, 160 subjects participated in total.
All sessions used an identical protocol. Upon arrival, subjects were given a
written set of instructions that the experimenter read aloud.
7 Subjects then reviewed
the instructions on their computer screens and were allowed to ask questions by
raising their hands and speaking to the experimenter in private. Subjects were not
allowed to communicate with one another throughout the session, except via the
decisions they entered on their terminal.
The decision-making phase of the session then consisted of 10 rounds. At the
beginning of each round subjects were assigned to groups of either three or four
(depending on treatment). Subjects were not told who of the other people in the room
were in their group, and group compositions changed from round to round. In
particular, the same set of subjects was never matched together twice. At the
beginning of each round subjects were also assigned roles, determining how many
votes they controlled, and roles also varied across rounds. In every round subjects
entered decisions anonymously, so that it was not possible to build up a reputation
across rounds. For statistical reasons, prior to the first round we formed two equally-
                                                
7 A copy of the instructions for the VETO treatment can be found in Appendix A.6
sized subsets of subjects and then formed groups from within these subsets; no
information passed across the two subsets, and so this procedure ensured that each
session resulted in two independent observations.
Each round had a random time limit between five and ten minutes for groups
to bargain over the division of 120 points. If no agreement were reached before the
random deadline, each group member would earn zero points. Bargaining proceeded
as follows. Any subject could put a proposal on the table by completing a proposal
form on the left side of their screen. Once a proposal was on the table all members of
the group would see it on the right side of their screens. Any subject was also able to
replace their proposal with another at any time until the round ended. Thus at any time
there may be up to three proposals (VETO and SYMMETRIC treatments) or up to
four proposals (ENLARGED treatment) on the table. Subjects could indicate which
proposals were acceptable or unacceptable, and by indicating a proposal was
acceptable they placed their votes in favor of that proposal. The first proposal to
receive the required number of votes was enforced, and subjects received the points
specified in that proposal.
At the end of the experiment subjects were privately paid according to their
accumulated point earnings from all 10 rounds, using an exchange rate of 3p per point
(VETO and SYMMETRIC treatments) or 4p per point (ENLARGED treatment).
Earnings averaged £12 per subject in all sessions, and ranged from a minimum of
£2.12 to a maximum of £20.40.
8 Sessions lasted, on average, 35 minutes, with no
session taking longer than 55 minutes.
Overview of results
In our design there is a possibility of negotiations breaking down, since each round
had a randomly determined time limit between five and ten minutes. In fact, this time
restriction did not bind in our experiment. In VETO, where there is a unique core
allocation giving the entire budget to the strong player, agreements are quickly
reached: only in two of 160 games did bargaining extend beyond five minutes, and
even then agreements were reached before the random deadline. The games used in
SYMMETRIC and ENLARGED have an empty core, and our prior expectations were
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that subjects would find it more difficult to reach an agreement.
9 As it turned out, an
agreement was reached in every game well before there was any danger of the random
deadline coming into effect, and the maximum duration of negotiations in these
treatments was 2¼ minutes. Thus, there are no disagreement outcomes in any of the
480 games of our experiment.
10
Figure 1 shows how voting power -- measured as average earnings for a given
player-role -- develops across rounds for each treatment. As shown in the left panel,
the strong player's voting power is greatest in VETO and is smallest in
SYMMETRIC. Correspondingly, the weak players have most voting power in
SYMMETRIC and least in VETO.
11
--- Figure 1 about here ---
It is also evident in Figure 1 that earnings change across rounds, particularly in
VETO and ENLARGED. To analyze these dynamics we computed Spearman rank
correlation coefficients between the strong player's voting power and round for each
matching group. In SYMMETRIC four coefficients are positive and four are negative,
and so we cannot reject the null hypothesis that power is equally likely to increase or
decrease with experience using a two-sided sign-test (p-value = 1.000). On the other
hand, for VETO and ENLARGED all coefficients are positive, and so we can reject
the null hypothesis that power is equally likely to increase or decrease with
experience (p-value = 0.008). Further analysis of these treatments shows that the
significant increase in the strong player’s voting power occurs in earlier rounds: in the
last four rounds we find no evidence of a relationship between voting power and
round (VETO p-value = 0.727; ENLARGED p-value = 1.000). Thus, the strong
player’s voting power can be described as initially increasing, before stabilizing
around 91 in the last four rounds of VETO and around 69 in the last four rounds of
                                                
9 As Kahan and Rapoport (1984, p.67) have argued, “… in a coreless game, some constraints on
coalitional activity must be operative in the society, or else it will become ensnared in the endless
rounds of successive secessions from proposed [payoff configurations].”
10 The early agreements in our experiment contrast sharply with results from two-person (Roth et al.,
1988, Gächter and Riedl, 2005) and three-person bargaining (Bolton et al., 2003), where there are
pronounced deadline effects.
11 We also noted considerable asymmetry between the earnings of the two weak players in some
matching groups. In particular, earnings were significantly higher for player 2 than player 3. However,
all the results reported below, with one exception noted later, apply whether the earnings of players 2
and 3 are regarded separately or pooled.8
ENLARGED. By comparison, in SYMMETRIC the strong player’s voting power in
the last four rounds is 47.
Several patterns in the data suggest the changes in early rounds reflect a
learning process as subjects become more familiar with strategic aspects of the game.
For example, in the first round agreements to divide the 120 points equally among all
members were quite frequent, occurring in 17 of 48 (≈  35%) groups. For many
subjects this must have seemed a natural and acceptable outcome. However, as rounds
progressed equal divisions were observed less frequently. In the last round only 2 of
48 groups (≈  4%) agreed upon an equal division. Figure 2 shows that the frequency of
equal divisions decreases over rounds in all three treatments.
--- Figure 2 about here ---
Broadly speaking, proposals in which the pie was equally divided tended to be
replaced by proposals allocating zero to at least one player. Since in all three
treatments a proposal can be implemented without unanimous support, a winning
coalition can form that excludes some players, and the members of this coalition
maximize their point earnings by allocating zero points to outsiders. In all treatments
we observed an increase in the frequency of minimal winning coalitions across
rounds, as shown in Figure 3. Across all three treatments, minimal winning coalitions
formed in 22 of 48 groups (≈  46%) in the first round, compared with 41 of 48 (≈  85%)
in the last round.
--- Figure 3 about here ---
In VETO, minimal winning coalitions, which must include the strong player,
formed in 123 of 160 (≈  77%) games overall, and in 53 of 64 (≈  83%) games in the
last four rounds. In SYMMETRIC, minimal winning coalitions, which can be
comprised of any two players, formed in 126 of 160 (≈  79%) games overall, and in 59
of 64 (≈  92%) games in the last four rounds. In ENLARGED there can be two
different types of minimal winning coalition: the strong player with one of the weak
players, or the two weak players with the new member. In this treatment, the first type
of coalition was much more common. Minimal winning coalitions excluding the9
strong player formed in only 8 of 160 (5%) games, and in only 1 of 64 (≈  2%) games
in the last four rounds; minimal winning coalitions including the strong player
occurred in 116 of 160 (≈  73%) games, and in 58 of 64 (≈  91%) games in the last four
rounds.
12
When minimal winning coalitions formed, the budget was often split equally
among its members. However, Figure 4 shows that the extent to which this occurred
varied substantially across treatments. In SYMMETRIC the proportion of 60-60
divisions was rather stable and averaged 80% over all rounds, but in the other two
treatments there are fewer cases of equal division within a minimal winning coalition.
In ENLARGED, 36% of minimal winning coalitions split the budget evenly between
its members. In VETO, where any minimal winning coalition must include the strong
player, minimal winning coalitions agreed a 60-60 division 37% of the time in the
first round, but this proportion decreased to zero by the last round.
---Figure 4 about here ---
In order to further study departures from equal division within minimal
winning coalitions we restrict attention to minimal winning coalitions involving the
strong player, and study how the strong player’s share varies across rounds and
treatments (see Figure 5). The set of minimal winning coalitions featuring the strong
player is the same in all treatments: she can form a winning coalition with either weak
player. However, very different patterns are evident across treatments. In VETO the
strong player earned 77 points on average in the first round, compared with 98 points
in the last round. Thus, as rounds progressed the strong player was demanding and
getting larger shares of the pie. In SYMMETRIC we see a stable pattern: when the
strong player is included in a minimal winning coalition she gets about half the pie. In
ENLARGED the strong player’s earnings within minimal winning coalitions
averaged more than 60 points in every matching group, but were nevertheless
substantially lower than in VETO, being stable around 69 points. Thus, because the
weak players can form a winning coalition with the new member, this threat appears
                                                
12 The finding that some subjects are willing to propose distributions that give zero to another subject,
and others are willing to vote for such a proposal, is consistent with other experiments on multi-person
bargaining (see Güth and van Damme, 1998, Fréchette et al., 2003, Kagel et al., 2005, and Okada and
Riedl, 2005).10
to limit the strong player’s ability to extract larger shares of the pie from one of the
weak players.
---Figure 5 about here ---
We find the comparison between the strong player’s power in a minimal
winning coalition in the SYMMETRIC treatment and her power in the ENLARGED
treatment particularly interesting. The strong player’s earnings within a minimal
winning coalition differ significantly across these two treatments, whether we focus
on all rounds (Wilcoxon two-sided p-value = 0.003) or just the last four rounds
(Wilcoxon two-sided p-value = 0.004), and this suggests that the amount the strong
player gets when she forms a coalition with one of the weak players depends on the
alternative coalition opportunities available to the weak players. This contrasts with
the predictions of theories of ex post payoff division. Gamson’s (1961) theory
predicts ex post payoff division proportional to the voting weights, so that the strong
player should get 72 points and the weak player should get 48 points when they form
a coalition in both treatments.
13 Other theories of ex post payoff division also fail to
capture the significant difference. The Bargaining Set (Davis and Maschler, 1967),
Kernel (Davis and Maschler, 1965) and the Aspiration solution concepts (see Bennett,
1983) all predict that the coalition of the strong and one of the weak players divide the
120 points equally in both treatments.
Voting power: tests of hypotheses
For formal comparisons of voting power we use non-parametric tests applied to sets
of independent observations. We first examine how voting power varies with voting
weights within treatments. Table 2 presents the strong and weak player’s voting
power for each treatment.
14
                                                
13 Fréchette et al. (2005) also found that Gamson’s law performs badly in a game similar to our
SYMMETRIC treatment.
14 Recall that there are no disagreements. Thus, in VETO and SYMMETRIC the strong player’s
earnings plus twice the weak player’s earnings equals 120 points. In ENLARGED the strong player’s
earnings plus twice the weak player’s earnings is less than 120 points. The residual is the earnings of
the new member. Averaging over all rounds this player earns 5.6 points per round, while averaging
over the last four rounds she earns 0.9 points per round.11














strong player 80.6 91.1 46.2 47.2 59.7 68.9
weak player 19.7 14.4 36.9 36.4 27.3 25.1
In VETO the strong player earns more than a weak player in every single
matching group, whether we focus on all rounds or just the last four rounds. Thus the
voting power of the strong player is significantly greater than that of the weak player
(one-sided sign-test p-value = 0.004), as predicted by all the power indices given in
Table 1. The comparison of strong and weak player earnings in the SYMMETRIC
treatment provides the one case in which asymmetries between the two weak players
affect our results. We find that the earnings of the strong player are not significantly
different from the earnings of player 2 (all rounds: two-sided sign-test p-value =
0.727; last four rounds: two-sided sign-test p-value = 1.000) but are significantly
greater than the earnings of player 3 (all rounds: one-sided sign-test p-value = 0.035;
last four rounds: one-sided sign-test p-value = 0.035). Averaging over the two weak
players, we find that the strong player earns significantly more if we consider all
rounds (one-sided sign-test p-value = 0.035), but not if we focus on the last four
rounds (one-sided sign test, p-value = 0.363).
15 Finally, for ENLARGED, we find that
the strong player earns significantly more than a weak player in every single matching
group whether we look at all rounds or just the last four rounds (one-sided sign-test p-
value = 0.004). This last finding is not predicted by the Nucleolus, but is consistent
with the other power indices given in Table 1.
For each index and treatment we used two-sided sign tests to test the
hypothesis that the strong player’s voting power is equally likely to be above or below
the prediction. None of the indices performed well in this sense. In the case of the
Nucleolus it is not surprising that we can reject the hypothesis in VETO
16, since any
deviation from the point prediction must be below, but we can also reject the
                                                
15 In this treatment 101/160 (≈  63%) games result in two-player coalitions who divide the pie 60-60
between themselves. However player 2 was included in such coalitions more than twice as often as
player 3.
16 Kagel et al. (2005) obtain a similar result with a structured protocol for negotiations: the share of the
veto player is well below the equilibrium prediction.12
hypothesis in ENLARGED.
17 Likewise, the naïve index is rejected in VETO (p-value
= 0.008) and ENLARGED (p-value 0.008). For the case of the Shapley and Banzhaf
indices we also reject in ENLARGED (for both indices p-value = 0.008), but their
performances in VETO depends on whether we focus on all or just the last four
rounds. Using all rounds we cannot reject the null hypothesis for either index
(Shapley: p-value = 1.000; Banzhaf: p-value = 0.289).
18 If, however, we focus on the
last four rounds we reject the null hypothesis at a 10% significance level for both
indices (p-value = 0.070 in both cases).
Brams and Affuso (1976) use the Shapley and Banzhaf power indices to
predict that an original member’s voting power increases when a new member is
admitted to a voting group. We now compare treatments in order to test this
prediction. First we consider the comparison between VETO and ENLARGED. The
Shapley and Banzhaf indices, and indeed indices based on the core (or its extension),
predict that this will increase the voting power of the weak player. Our experiment
delivers strong empirical support for this prediction, since the weak player’s earnings
are significantly higher in ENLARGED (all rounds: one-sided Wilcoxon test p-value
= 0.006; last four rounds: one-sided Wilcoxon test p-value = 0.006).
Next we consider the comparison between treatments SYMMETRIC and
ENLARGED. Brams and Affuso predict, on the basis of the Shapley and Banzhaf
indices, that the addition of the new player with one vote will increase the strong
player’s voting power. Interestingly, this prediction does not follow from other
indices, such as the Nucleolus. In our experiment the strong player earns significantly
more in ENLARGED than SYMMETRIC (all rounds: one-sided Wilcoxon test p-
value = 0.003; last four rounds: one-sided Wilcoxon test p-value = 0.001). Thus the
paradox of enlargement, as predicted by Brams and Affuso, is observed in our
experiment.
CONCLUSIONS
Our experiment provides empirical measures of how voting weights and voting rules
influence voting power in weighted voting games. Our focus is on the three games
                                                
17 In every single matching group, regardless of whether we consider all or last four rounds, the strong
player earns more than predicted in ENLARGED (p-value = 0.008).
18 In fact the average earnings of the strong player is remarkably close to the Shapley value.
Murnigham and Roth (1977) obtain a similar result.13
discussed in the seminal work of Brams and Affuso (1976). These games illustrate
how the enlargement of a voting body may benefit an original member, even if the
decision rule and her relative voting weight vis-à-vis the other original members are
held constant.
In one of the cases studied, a strong player loses her veto power when a new
member is added, and this strengthens the power of weaker members. This prediction
is shared by sophisticated power indices, and also receives strong empirical support
from our experiment. On the other hand, individual power indices on which this
comparative static prediction could be based do not deliver good point predictions.
When the strong player is a veto player she gets significantly less than the entire pie
(i.e. her core allocation), but in the later rounds of the session she gets significantly
more than predicted by the Shapley or Banzhaf indices. In the larger voting body the
strong player attains significantly more than predicted by any of the power indices
considered.
In the second case studied by Brams and Affuso the prediction that
enlargement will benefit an original member is more controversial, since it relies on
the particular power indices they use. The Shapley and Banzhaf indices predict that
the strong player benefits from the addition of a new member, while the Nucleolus
concept predicts no change in voting power. Here our experiment supports Brams and
Affuso’s comparative static prediction: the paradox of new members is observed in
our data.
Our results underscore the important point made by voting theorists: that
formal analysis is required in order to accurately predict the effects of changes in
voting bodies. While an important part of such analysis should be based on theoretical
analysis of the properties of different voting weights and rules, we also argue that
empirical methods have an important complementary role. Empirical evidence is
particularly valuable when, as in one of the cases we study, alternative solution




This is an experiment about group decision-making. There are other people in this
room who are also participating in this experiment. You must not talk to them or
communicate with them in any way during the experiment. The experiment will take
about one hour, and at the end you will be paid in private and in cash. The amount of
money you earn will depend on the decisions that you and the other participants
make.
In this experiment you will participate in ten rounds. In each round you will be in a
group with two other people, but you will not know which of the other people in this
room are in your group. The people in your group will change from round to round,
and in particular you will never be matched with the same set of two other people
twice. The decisions made by you and the other people in your group will determine
how many points you earn in that round. At the end of the experiment you will be
paid according to your total point earnings from all ten rounds. You will be paid 3p
per point.
Description of a round
At the beginning of each round, you will be randomly allocated a subject
identification number, either 1, 2, or 3. (Thus, your identification number may change
from round to round.) Each person controls a number of votes depending on his or her
identification number as follows:
Subject Identification Number 1 2 3
Number of Votes 3 2 2
In each round you and the other people in your group have 120 points to divide. You
and the other people in your group can make proposals about how these points are to
be divided among the group members. You and the other people in your group can
also cast votes in favour of proposals. The first proposal to receive five votes will be
enforced. When a proposal is enforced the round ends and each person earns the
number of points specified in that proposal.15
There will be a time limit for each round. This time limit will be some whole number
of seconds between 300 and 600, but you will not be informed of the exact time limit.
This means that the round could end suddenly at any time between 300 seconds (five
minutes) and 600 seconds (ten minutes). If no proposal has been enforced when the
round ends, each person in your group will earn zero points in the round.
All rounds will be identical except that your subject number may change from round
to round, the other people in your group may change from round to round, and the
time limit may change from round to round.
How you make proposals
At the beginning of a round your computer screen will look like the one shown in
Figure 1. On the left side of the screen there is a form for making proposals. To make
a proposal you must specify the number of points that each person in your group will
receive. For each person you can type in any whole number between 0 and 120, but
the total number of points received by the group members must add up to 120. When
you have completed a proposal you click on the "submit" button to submit it.
Your proposal will then appear on the right side of the screen, in the list of "proposals
on the table." A sample screen is shown in Figure 2, except that the entries marked
XXX will be the numbers you entered in your proposal. As long as the round has not
already ended, you can amend your proposal by simply completing a new proposal
and submitting it. The new proposal will replace the old one.
How proposals are enforced
Once a proposal is on the table, all the people in your group will see it on the right
side of their screens. At any time there may be up to three proposals on the table, one
submitted by each person in your group. For each proposal there is an "accumulated
votes" counter that informs all people in the group of how many votes are currently in
favour of the proposal. When a proposal is submitted it automatically receives the
votes of the person who submitted it. Thus, during the round your screen might look
like the one shown in Figure 3 (except that the entries marked XXX will correspond
to the decisions made by participants).16
For each proposal on the table you can indicate if it is acceptable by clicking on the
"acceptable" button next to that proposal. If you do this, the proposal will receive your
votes. If you change your mind after indicating that a proposal is acceptable you will
be able to withdraw your support by clicking on the "unacceptable" button. The
"accumulated votes" counter will change to keep track of how many votes are
currently in favour of the proposal.
You can use your votes to support more than one proposal. However, the first
proposal to have five votes in its favour will be the one that is enforced, and this
proposal will determine how many points you receive.
Ending the session
At the end of round ten your total points from all rounds will be converted to cash at a
rate of 3p per point and you will be paid this amount in private and in cash.
Now, please click on the "start" button and begin reviewing the instructions on your
screen. If you have any questions raise your hand and a monitor will come to your
desk to answer them. When you have finished reading through the screens reviewing
the instructions, click on the ready button to indicate that you are ready to begin the
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Figure 5. Strong player’s voting power within minimal winning coalitions
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